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ment protect the people's interest in and upon the railroads
of- the State." This right has been exercised to a great
extent in both instances, and the many additions to the
railroad law of each of these States which have been made
at the suggestion or with the advice of its commission, tes-.
tify to the harmony existing between boards of this class
and the State government, as well as to the influence which
they indirectly but properly exert upon the corporations.
RESTRICTIONS UPON LOCAL AND SPECIAL
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II.
Tm DISTINCTIONS BETwEEN GENERAL, LOCAL AND
SPECIAL LEGISLATION.
THE word "general is defined by Webster as "relat-
ing to a genus or kind; pertaining to a whole class'or
order;" while "special," by the same authority, means
"pertaining to a species or sort; designed 'for a particular
purpose or person ;" and "local," "pertaining to a partic-
ular place, or to a fixed or limited portion of space."
The term "general law," as used in our State consti-
tutions, has not been found eiasy of definition, and no court
has as yet undertaken to state its meaning with aly great
measure of exactness.' It is clear that it is not merely a
law in regard to a general subject, for if the subject be
regulated in a particular locality only, or as affecting par-
ticular persons, the law regulating it is local or special,
and not general.' From the definitions given above, it
I See the remarks in the opinions in Earle v. San Francisco Board of
Education, 55 Cal., 489; Matter of N. Y. Elev. Ry. Co., 70 N. Y., 327,
35o; Matter of Church, 92 id., i; State v. Lean, 9 Wis., q7gt
2 See Ryan v. Johnson, 5 Cal., 85; People v. C. P. R. P. Co.,-43 id.,
398,' 43; State v. Judges, 21 Ohio St., i; State v. Covington, 29 id.,
o2 ; McGill v. State, 34 id., 228 ; State v. Shearer, 47 id., 275.
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follows that a general Act must be one which is designed
neither for one or more particular persons, nor to
operate exclusively in any particular part or parts of the
State; yet such an Act is not necessarily universal, i. e.,
capable of operating upon all persons or all things within
the State legislated for.! Provided that an Act be not
ekpressly limited to operate upon particular persons or in
particular localities, it is enough to constitute it a general
Act, first, that it should operate wherever the circumstances
to which it is applicable exist in the State, and secondly,
that it should operate uniformly, i. e., upon "every person
who is brought within the relations and circumstances pro-
vided for," without regard to the number of such persons
as compared with the whole population of the State.2  Or,
I " Are we then to understand that a general law is only one which
operates upon all persons or all things? If so, it is obvious that our
general laws are very few, if, indeed, there are any of that class. Obvi-
ously such cannot be the meaning of the words 'of a general nature ' as
here used [in the constitution]. The word general comes from genus, and
relates to a whole genus or kind, or'in other words to a whble-class or
order. Hence a law which affects a class of persons or things less than
all may be a general law:" Brooks v, Hyde, 37 Cal., 366, 375.
"The term "general law' does not import universality in the
subject or operation of such law:" Van Riper v. Parsons, 4o N. J.
L., r.
2 L. R. & Ft. S. R. R. Co. z. Hanniford, 49 Ark:C, 291 ; McAunich v.
M. & M. R. Co., 20 Io., 343; People v. Wright, 70 Il., 388; Snyder v.
Warford, ii Mo., 513 ; People v. Formosa, 68 S. C. N. Y., 272; and see
Mayer v. Deermon, 2 Sn. (Tenn.), 1o4, where an Act requiring the sheriff
of DeKalb County to hold certain municipal elections for the town of
Alexandria in each year, was held not to be "the law of the land," as it
did not extend to and embrace all who came into the like situation and
circumstances. As was said in a recent case in North Dakota, an Act
general in form and relating to all the objects to which it should relate
except one, is as much a special law as if it related to one object only:
Edmonds v. Herbrandson (N. D.), 5o N. W. Rep., 970.
It should not be forgotten that while uniform operation is essential
to a general law (French v. Teschemaker, 24 Cal., 518, .544; Brooks v.
Hyde, 37 id., 366), it is not the only requisite. It is incorrect to say (as
•was said in Cox v. State, 8 Tex. App., 254, 286, misquoting Brooks v.
Hyde, 37 Cal., 366), that every law is general which operates equally
upon all persons and all things upon whom it acts at all. Such uni-
formity may often characterize a local or special law, and this must
indeed be the case with every law affecting only a single person or thing.
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looking at it from another standpoint, it is enough that a
general Act should operate upon one or more particular con-
ditions (as distinguished from persons and localities), and
attach thereto certain consequences, so that whenever and
wherever the conditions exist the consequences follow,'
and where the conditions do not exist the consequences do
not follow.
Thus an Act making railroads liable for double dam-
ages for stock killed in consequence 6f their failure to
erect and maijitain fences is a general Act, not only
because it appiies to all railroads, affecting any one of them
whenever stock is killed by it through insufficient fencing,
but also because there are no other carriers wh6 .re in a
position to kill stock as railroad companies are, or whose
neglect to keep out stock by fencing would expose human
life and property to the same risk as in the case of railroads.2
For. th6 same reason an Act is general which .allows the
Rlaintiff in suc! cases, or in those of the violation of d law
regulating.rates of transport.tion,,an attorney's fee as costs
in addition to actual damages, for such an Act is not to be
regarded as affecting merely one species of litigation, -but
a. whole class of injuries, the remedy fox :which is sought
by the litigation.' On the other hand, an Act requiring
railroad companies to iay their employees within fifteen
-days 6f the date of a demand for wages due, under penalty
of an additional payment of 2o per cent. upon the amount
of wages in default, is special,- as railroad companies 'do, not
In McCormick v. Rusch, 15 1o., 127, it wAS even stated that an Act pro-
vidingfor a continuance in cases where the defendant was in the actual
military service of the United States; though certainly a law of uniform
operation, was probablynot of a general nature, because it referred to a
special class of defendants. If, however, such class necessarilyrequired
legislation peculiar to itself, then by the proper'doctrine of classification
the Act was general.
I Haskel v. Burlington, 30 10., 232; Iowa R. R. Land Co. v. Soper,
38 id., 112.
2 HuMes V. M. R.1 . Co., 82 Mo. 221; see M. M.. R. Co. v. Humes,
115 U. S., 512.
3 P. D. & C. R. Co.. v. Duggan, zog IMI., 537; B. C. R. & N. R. Co. v.
Dey, 82 1o., 312; Perkins v. St. I,., I., M. & S. R. Co., 103 Mo., 52. "
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occupy a different relation. to their employees from that of
all other employers.'
An Act creating a short cause calendar in all courts of
record in the State, and giving precedence to the cases on
that caleildar, is not a special Act in regard to the practice
of courts, as it applies to all courts of record, and to what'
may fairly be considered a distinctive class of cases in those
courts ;2 but an Act establishing a procedure in certain
localities, differing from that required elsewhere in matters
of the same sort, would be a local law.3
n The extent of the operation of a really general law is
not determined by arbitrary limitations imposed by_ the
legislature, but by the existence of the conditions on which
the law is to operate. "A law," therefore, as was said by
the New Jersey Supreme Court, "is to be regarded as gen-
eral when its provisions apply to all objects of legislation,
distinguished alike by qualities and attributes which neces-
sitate the legislation to which the enactment has manifest
relation. Such laws must embrace all and exclude none
whose conditions and wants. render such lgislatlon eqttally
necessary or appropriate to them as a class.4  -
Of course, it is not every condition or set of conditions
the existence of which makes an Act operating upon it a
general law. Thus while an Act providing for the taxkation
of mortgages generally is a general Act, a law for the tax-
ation of one kind of mortgages, those on land situated in
more than one county, is special, since that species of mort-
gage does not so differ from others as to require that their
taxation should be made under a different law.' So rail-
I San Antonio & A. P. Ry. C9. v. Wilson (Tex. App., 1892), 19 S. W.
Rep., 91o. In A. & N. P. R. Co. v. Baty, 6 Neb., 37, a statute authorizing
double damages for non-payment within thirty days of demand of claims
for stock killed by railroad companies was held void as an attempt to take
property without due process of law, but it might also have been treated
.as special legislation.
Jensen v. Fricke, r33 Ill., 171 ; L4. N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Wallace,
13 6 id., 87.
3 Ruan St., 132 Pa., 257, 277-
4 Randolph v. Wood, 49 N. J. L., 85, 88.
5 Dundee Mtge. Co. v. School Dist., io Sawy. (U.S.), 52.
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roads situated in more than one county do not, for the pur-
pose of the levying and collection of taxes upon their
property, differ from those situate in one county only, and
an Act in regard to this matter, in the case of such rail-
roads only, is special, although the Constitution may itself
recognize the need of a particular method of assessing the
property of such railroads for taxation.1
From the illustrations above given, it is evident that
Webster's definition of the word ' general," as "relating
to a genus or kind; pertaining to a whole class or order,"
satisfactorily covers the case of a general Act, and that, as
stated in the leading Pennsylvania case on legislative
classification, ' and approved in many other States,3 "a
statute which relates to persons or things as a class is a
general law, while a statute which relates to particular
persons or things of a class is special." Hence, postponing
for the present the inquiry into what constitutes a class for
legislative purposes, and premising only that the class to,
which the general laws -are applicable. must be real .and
substantial, it may be said in brief that:
(I) A general law is one which applies to and operates
uniformly upon all members of any class of persons, places.
or things, requiring legislation p'eculiar to itself in the
matter covered by the law.
(2) A special law is one .which relates either to partic-'
ular persons, places or things, or to persons,' places or
things which, though not particularized, are separated,
by any method of selection, from the whole class to which
the lawv might, but for such limitation, be applicable.
(3). A local law is one whose operation is confined
within territorial limits other than those of the whole
State or any properly constituted clasi of localities therein.
1 People v. Cent. Pac. Ry. Co., 83 Cal., 393.
Wheeler v. Phila., 77 Pa., 338. For an earlier recognition of the
same doctrine, see Henry v. Henry, 13 Ind., 251.
3 State v. Tolle, 7I Mo., 645; matter of N. Y. R1L R. Co., 7o N. Y.,
327, 350; Matter of Church, 92 id., i. The same doctrine is recognized
in Lake v. Palmer, 18 Fla., 5o1 State v. Spande, 37 Minn., 322; Humes
v. M. P. P.. Co., 82 Mo., 231; Philips v. M. R.. R.. Co., 86 id., 540; It r&
Commrs,, 49 N. J. L., 474.-
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The term "local law" is rather modern, having been
brought into use by the necessity of distinguishing between
those public laws which are general and those which are
not, the latter including both special and local laws. The
matter to which a local law relates may be either general
or special, but in either case the law itself is not in force
outside of the locality or- localities for which it is passed.
A local law in regard to liens, mortgages, elections or
judicial procedure is local only, not special; while a law in
regard to particular persons or things in a place, or to the
government or affairs of particular places, is both local and
special. The fields of local and special legislation overlap,
but they are not conterminous. Hence, unless there be
something to indicate that a prohibition of special legisla-
tion as to any given subject was intended as including all
legislation which is not general, such prohibition is not to
be understood as forbidding purely local laws as to such
subject;' though it must be admitted that the term§
"local law" and "special law' have often been loosely
used, as if the former were one species of the latter,' and
that the absence of any reference, in some constitutions, to
'Thus the constitution of Maryland forbids both local and special
laws as to certain matters, but special laws only for "any case for which
provision has been made by existing general law," and this has been
held not to forbid a road law for a particular county, although a general
road law existed. The Court said that local laws of this sort "are
applicable to all persons, and are distinguished from public general laws
only in this, that they are confined in their operation to certain pre-
scribed or defined territorial limits, and the violation of them must in
the nature of things be local :." State v. County Commissioners, 29 Md.,
516. See also Lankford v. County Commissioners, 73 Md., 105, as to a
local election law.
2 The Texas constitution (Art. XVI, 23) provides that the legislature
may "pass general and special laws for the inspection of cattle,
provided that any local law thus passed shall be submitted to the free-
holders of the section to be affected thereby." It has been held that the
words "special" and "local" are here used as synonymous and inter-
'changeable: Lastro v. State, 3 Tex. App., 363.
3 Those of Kansas, Kentucky (I85O), Maine, Michigan, Minnesota,
Ohio, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin. In the
North Carolina constitution the legislation forbidden is described as "pri-
vate," except that in regard to corporations, which is denoted "special."
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local legislation, seems to indicate an opinion that it was
superfluous to distinguish it from special.
The definitions given above are made expressly with
reference to the modem restrictions on local and special
legislation, and indicate the change which these restrictions
have introduced in'the use of the terms "general law" and
"special law." As originally used, these terms were
respectively synonymous with "public law" and "private
law," and interchangeable with them. Thus BLACKST0NE,
in distinguishing the kinds of Acts, states that they are
"general or special, public or private." Comytn's Digest
uses the former terms,2 Bacon's Abridgement the latter,8
and the same interchangeable use is seen in several reported
cases." As the terms were so uised, the chief practical dif-
ferences between public (or general) and private (or specil)
laws were that the former received judicial notice in tlhe
courts and were binding upon all of the public who might
happen to be affected by them; while the latter were m.
quired to be pleaded and proved like .any other facts,5 and'
did not bind those whb were strangers to them unless"by,
express words or a necessary implication of the iiitintion df
Parliament.6 In the summary of the earlier authorities ip
Coke's note to Holland's Case,7 it is pointed out that.
statulum generale and statutum spedale relate to genera etd
spee s respectively, but the -term genus was not construed'
to mean a class ii hfe modem sense. Thus laws relatinj
to all spiritual persons, all officers, or all trades 8 were
i BL Com., 86..
2 Com. Dig. Parl. R., 6,7.
3 Bac. Abr., Stats. F.
' Samuel v. Evans, 2 Term,'569; Burnham v, Acton,\ 7 Rob. (N. Y.),
395; Strien v. Foltz, 113 Pa., 349, 353; Btirhop v. Milwaukee, 21 Wis.,
259, where the Supreme Court stated that it hakI repeatedly treated the
term "general law" as synonymous with "public law"- as regarded the
necessity of publishing general laws.
5 1 BI. Com., 86; Dwarris ohi Stats., 629; Bac. Abr., Stats. F.; Com.
Dig.'Parl. R., 6, 7.
6 Barrington's Case, 8 Rep., 138; Luey v. Levingtoq, i Vent.,.i75.
7 4 Rep., 75a.
Is Kirk v. Nowell, i Term, 125.
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general, while those relating to all bishops, all sheriffs, oi
the trade of grocers were special. In the course of time,
however, the distinction taken between genera and sbecies
became less artificial,' and it was considered that a law
which in its operation affected any of the public who might
come within its provisions was general. This gradual
change is illustrated by the remarkable history of the statute
of 23 Henry VI, c. 9, relating to bail in civil causes, which
is unique in the annals of law in that it took the English
courts three hundred and forty-four years to decide whether
it was a general Act or not. It was repeatedly held that as
it related to sheriffs, a particular species of officers, it was
special, ' but the common-sense view which finally prevailed
was that, -as every person who might be arrested was within
its provisions, it was pu.blic and general.'
BLACKSTONE defines a "general or public Act" as "a
universal rule that regards the whole country," while he
states that "special or private Acts are rather exceptions
than rules, being those which only operate upon particular
persons and private concerns." These definitions have
been repeatedly cited with approval, but they hardly cover
the case of Acts which do not concern particular persons or
private affairs only, yet whose operation is expressly con-
fined to certain localities. Such Acts were at one time
classed among the special or private laws,' but in the
present century they have been looked at more with
regard to the persons affected than with regard to their
form, and. consequently their public character has been
more fully recognized. It has been held not to be essential
' See Dawson v. Paver, 5 Hare, 415, where it is stated that the dis-
tinction must depend on the nature of the case, and not on the form of
the act, or on whether it contains a clause forbidding that it shall be
deemed a public act.
2 Holland's Case, 4 Rep., 75 a; Allen v. Robinson, Sid., 22 ; Parker
v. Welby, id., 439; S. c. sub. nom., Benson v. Welby, 2 Saund., 154, and
see note.
'Bentley v. Hoar, i Lev. 86; Oky v. Sell, 2 id., io3 ; Mills v. Bond,
z Str., 399; Samuel v. ]$vans, 2 Term, 569; Lovell v. Sheriffs, x5 East,
320.
4See remarks of LORD, J., in Maxwell v. Tillamook Co., 20 Ore., 495.
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that a public law should operate throughout the whole
realm or State, but merely that within the sphere of its
operation it should affect all members of the community,
no matter how local or restricted that sphere of operation
might be. Thus the metropolitan police Acts 1 were held
public and general in view of "the public importanceofi
the right that they maintained and the generality of their
application to all the Queen's subjects within the metrq-
politan police district; "'2 and-an Act establislhing a public
harbor and authorizing tolls to be taken, though private in
form, was held by Lord CAmNS as entitled to be judicially
noticed as a public Act, it being an Act of the most comFpr
hensive kind, and relating, to publid matters, tfiough
unquestionably local.' With the rise, too, of great corpora-
tions, private in that they had no connection with the
government, yet exercising public franchises and whose
dealings were with great numbers of the community, it Was
inevitabl that many Acts of incorporition, .thoufgh i. one
sense private, should be held to be pfactic ly public.'
In America it has been decided that as the preserva-
tion of fish is for the public benefit, Acts for their preserva:-
tion in certain specified rivers aie public, obligatory to ali
the citizens, and to be taken notii-e of by the courts.5  So
Acts regulating the pilotage in Boston harbor,6 regulat-
ing the putting of pine timber into the Conn.ecticut
River,7 prescribing the limits of 'particular coliuties -and
towns,8 locating county seats,' incorporating partic a'
1 2 and 3 Vict., c. 47; 8. 71.
2 Barnett v. Cox, 9 A. ahld E., N. S., 617.
3 Aiton v. Stephen, I App. Cas., 456.
4 Hargreaves v. L. & P. Ry,.Co., i Ry. Cas., 416.
5 Bqrnham v. Webster, 5 Mass., 266; .CoUt1iL v. McCuzdy, id., 324;
cited with approval, Pierce v. Kimball, 9 Green. (Me.), 54.-
6 Heridia v. Ayres, 12 Pick. (Mass.), 334.-
TScottv. Wilson,-3 N. H., 321. In the opinion in this case the Act
was referred to as a general law in relation to a particular place, rathei a
contradiction in terms.
8 New Portland v. New Vineyard, 6 Mq., 69, where it is stated thet
those Acts are public which regulate the general interests of the State or
of any of its divisions: Comth. v. Springfield, 7 Mass., 9.
9 State v. Lean, 9 Wis., 279.
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cities,' authorizing the State lands in a particular city to be.
laid off into lots and sold,2 relating to the affairs or the admin-
istration of justice in particular cities, counties, or town-
ships,3 authorizing an election to be held for certain officers in
a particular county,4 legalizing elections held in a. certain
county to authorize the issue of bonds in aid of a certain
railroad,' and affecting. particular highways, 6 have also
been held public; and the same view has been taken of
Acts incorporating particular banks,7 enabling a particular
foreign corporation to be sued like a domestic corporation,'
or authorizing railroad companies to -subscribe to the stock
of a particular foreign railroad corporation. 9
The underlying principle in all these cases is the same,
viz., that.though the law might operate within a restricted
territory, it affected a large number of people, treating
them simply as members of the community and without
any distinctions among them as individuals; or,- in other
words, that tlhe law was for the public benefit, not for that
of particular individuals. Thdugh the principle was prob-
ably correctly applied in these cases, and the various laws
passed upon in them may fairly be regarded- as public,
some of them are unquestionably confined in their operation
to particular localities, while others as unquestidnably con-
'Bass v. Fontleroy, xi Tex., 698; Clark v. Janesville, 1o Wis., 136.
2 West v. Blake, 4 Blackf. (Ind.), 234.
3McCuen v. State, i9 Ark., 63o; Bevens v. Baxter, 23 id., 387; Bin-
kert v. Jansen, 94 Ill., 283; Levy v. State, 6 Ind., 282; Covington v.
Hoadly, 83 Ky., 444; Preston v. Louisville, 84 id., x8; Connor v. Mayer,
5 N. Y., 285; Peop. v. McCann, I6 id., 58; Bretz v. Mayor, 6 Rob. (N. Y.),
627; Burnham v. Acton, 7 id., 395; Phillips v. Mayor, I Hilt. (N. Y.),
483.
'State v. Balt. Co. Commrs., 29 Md., 516.
Unity v. Burrage, o3 U. S., 447.
6 Jenkins v. Un. Tpke. Co., i Caines Cas. (N. Y.), 86.
Young v. Bk. of Alexandria, 4 Cr. (U. S.) 384; Douglass v. Bk. of
Missouri, I Mo., 20; Bk. of Utica v. Smedes, 3 Cow. (N. Y.), 662.
In Ferguson v. M. & M. Bk., 3 Sn. (Tenn.), 6o9, however, a bill to
charter a bank was held not to be a "bill of a general character" within
the meaning of the Tennessee constitution, such a bill being apparently
the same as a public bill in other States.
8 Fall Brook Coal Co. v. Lynch, 47 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 520.
9 White v. S. & U. R. Co., 14 Barb. (N. Y.), 559.
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cern the interest of a special part of the public only; in
other words, all of these laws are either local or special.
The fact that such laws were held to be public, how-
ever, made it necessary to regard the terms "Igeneral" and
"special" either as wholly technical, and to be used 'in a
sense distinct from the iiatural meaning of the words, or as
not equivaleht to "public" and "private." And accord-
ingly we find that.a distinction was eventually made both in
England and in some parts of America between public gen-
eral laws, which operate wherever the circumstances with
which they dealt existed, and public local and special laws,
whose operation was restricted either by the special nature
of their subject-matter, or by limitation to a certain locality.'
In America this distinction was made the more necessary
by those restrictions upon local and special legislation
which,.though at first few in numbei, and in some States
only in regard to the form of such laws 'and the manner of
their passage,2 have now become, in the great majority of
'States, of such importance in limiting and controlling the
action of legislatures.
In these restrictions the terms "general law" and
special law" are clearly used as defined above, and not as
respectively equivaletit to "public law" and "private law,'
since special legislation may be either public or private,
3
and a local law, though its subject may be of a public
nature and the people of the entire State may, in some
sense, have an interest in it, cannot be considered general.4
1 See, as to England, May's Law and Usage of Parliament (7th ed.),
chap. xIv.
2 New York Const. of X846, Art. III, i6.
' Dundee Mtg. Co. v. School Dist., io Sawy. (U. S.), 52, 78, where
the Court said: "A 'special; Act relates to a part and not the whole ....
and whether it is also considered a ' public ' or ' private ' one is alto-
gether immaterial and irrelevant."
4 Illinois v. Ill. Cent. R. R. Co., 33 Fed. R., 730, 764; Cass v. Dillon
20. St., 6o7. In the latter case, it was said of a law authorizing a county
to subscribe to the stock of a particular railroad, "That it is a public law,
of which the courts ex officio take notice, may well be admitted, but it
does not follow that it is of a general nature. It is no more of a general
nature than would be an Act to authorize the construction of a bridge or
the erection of a poorhouse. . . . All such Acts are of necessity local in
their character.
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Were this otherwise, were the fact that an Act was techfii-
cally " public," and to be taken judicial notice of by the
courts, sufficient to prevent its being regarded as special on
account of its subject-matter, or local on account of its
restricted operation, every prohibition of the constitutions
in regard to such legislation could be violated with impu-
nity.1
It does not make an Act the less local or special that
its operation is general as far as it goes, nor because it
applies to many persons or things. If the persons or
things be regarded by the law as indi-ciduals, be they few
-or many, this stamps it as special.2 The* form of.lan-
guage is also immaterial. If the particular places, persons
or things.to which the law applies be described in any way
that they may be known as distinguished from others of
like character or in like circumstances, the law is as special
as if the particular names or distinctive appellations were
Sgiven., So if the operation of a law is confined arbitrarily
to any portion of the Stite, great or small, it must be
regarded as local.
While the. definitions above given are based on. what
seems to be the best modern authority, the fact that
for so long a time the word "general" was considered
as equivalent to "public," and "special" to "priyate,"
when used in regard to legislation, has in a few States
produced, even in recent years, some uncertainty in
the use of these terms, and has prevented the dis-
tinction between general and special laws from being
clearly laid down. Thus in Wisconsin the word
"general" is held to be used in the constitution in
two different senses. In the provision that no general
law shall be in force until published, the word is -stated
to be used in the old sense as equivalent to "public,"
and to cover the case of laws in regard to a single
1 Dundee Mtg. Co. v. School Dist., io Sawy. (U. S.), 52, 79.
Topeka v.. Gillett, 32 Kan., 431.
3 Ibid.
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county or city,' while in the requirement of incorporation
by " general law" the word is used in the modem sense,
as opposed to "special law," without regard to whether
such special law be public or private,2 and a proper distinc-
tion is, moreover, taken between laws of a private nature,
but expressed to be public, and actually general laws.3
In Indiana, too, the Supreme Court has apparently
"filed to consider that the object which the framers of the
constitutional restrictions had in view, the prohibition of
special legislation in regard to many matters, was some-
thing quite different from what had led to the old distinc-
tion between general and special, or public and private, Acts.
This Court has accordingly laid it down that the distinction
between general and special laws being well known to the
common law, though sometimes a question of great nicety,'.
it accorded with well-established principle to assume that
the framers of the constitution intended the terms to be
understood in the sense which was at that time recognized
Sy the courts; and that, therefore, a special Act was one
such as at commoli law the courts would not notice unless
it were pleaded and proved.4  The Acts which.were sus-
tained as general under this view could, it is true, hav e
been properly so held on other grounds, one Act conferring
upon courts of a certain grade jurisdiction, of cases. of
violation of the liquor laws, and the other being for the.
enforcement of judgments against'railway companies for
stock killed by them.
lsewhere, however, this view of the identity of general
and public laws has led to even more anomalous decisions.
IIn re Boyle, 9 Wis., 264; State v. Lean, id.,279; Clark v. Janes--
ville, io id., z36. In Luling v. Racine, i Biss..(U. S.), 316, it was not
decided whether an Act authorizing a certain city to issue bonds, which"
Act had been passed as local, was general in the sense of requiring pub-
lication, since the city was, under the circumstances of the case, estopped
from defending on this ground.
2 Clark -v. Janesville, Io Wis., 136.
3Burhop v. Milwaukee, 21 Wis., 259; see Dundee Mtge. Co. v. School
Dist., io SaW. (U. S.), 52.
4 Hingle v. State, 24 Ind., 28; approved in T. L. B. R. Co., v. Nor
dyke, 27 id, 95.
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Thus, in Nevada an Act to provide for the indebtednesg of
a particular county was held not to conflict with the pro-
hibition of local and special laws regulating county busi-
ness, for the -reason that such an Act operated upon all
county creditors equally, wherever resident, and hence was
neither local nor special.'- In Oregon, too, local and special
legislation for laying out, opening and working on high-'
ways being forbidden, Acts to lay out particular roads were
sustained in Allen v.- Hirsch 2 on ground that, as the road
was in each case of importance to the whole State, the Act
providing for it was neither local nor special. In the fol-
lowing year, however, all the judges composing the court
in ISSo having left the bench, an Act regulating the fees
and salaries of sheriffs and clerks in fourteen counties was
held to be local within the meaning of the constitution,
and therefore void,' and very recently an Act making appro-
priations in aid of the construction of certain- specified
roads was overthrown for the same reason.' The former
case has been regarded as overruling Allen v. Hirsch,'
although it was not referred to in the opinion. In the
latter case the. reasons for the decision in Allen v. Hirsch
were explained, and the roads in question stated to have
been for the interest of the public rather than the locality,
yet the decision rendered must be regarded as wholly at
variance with the doctrine of Allen v. Hirsch.
In Texas, where the constitution empowers the legis-
lature to authorize " I by general Act"I the holding of special
terms of court when necessary, this has been-held to per-
mit an Act in regard to terms of court in a palticular judi-
cial district, and even a particular county, such an Act
being "intended to form a part of the general machinery
to be used in the administration of the laws of the State,"
and affecting equally all persons coming within its range.>
1Youngs v. Hall, 9 Nev., 2T2.
2 7 Ore., 412.
3 Manning v. Klippel, 9 Ore., 367.
1 Maxwell v. Tillamook Co., 20 Ore., 495.
5See Dundee Mtge. Co. v. School Dist., IO Sawy. (U. S.), 52.
6 Cox v. State, 8 Tex. App., 254.
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* Special and local legislation in regard: to courts was not'
,expressly forbidden, but the case came under the proviso
forbidding such laws in any case where a general law could
* be made applicable, and in this connection it was further
"held that no general law could possibly provide for a
* special term of court in but-one county, and that, there-
fore, what the constitution contemplated was merely an
'.Act passed according to the forms observed in the case of
'an ordinary general law. The obvious answer to this infer-
ence is that an actually general law, defining the circum-
stances under which a special term of court could be 'held
in any county, was perfectly feasible, and that the consti-
,'tution must be presumed to have contemplated a law
which was general in point of fact, and not, merely in
form, but this does not seem to have occurred to the Court.
In New Y6rk no clear distinction between general and
* special l.ws has been made,, the constitutional restrictions.
"being upon pivate and local laws only. The constitution
of 1846 required that "no 15rivate or special bill which
may be passed by the legislature shall embrace more tha'
one subject, and that shall be expressed in tl e title," a
provision since adopted in some other States. Under thi-
-.provision the Court of Appeals has held that the character.
.of "a'law, as general. or local, did not depend upon the
extent of the locality it affected, nor upon the number of,
people therein, but upon whether or hot its whole effect is
confined to a particular locality." Hence Acts reiating to,
'the government of a single city,2 enabling the supervisors
*of two -counties to levy- assessments for a bridge,' for the
improvement of a river in one county.,4 and relating to the
expense of judicial sales -in one county," ha-e been held
local. These' cases admit that an Act may be public and
yet local, but maintain, and justly, that even though pub-
'Peop. v. O'Brien, 38 N. Y., 193. See Conner v. Mayor, 5 id., 285,
where practically the same point was raised, but not decided.
2 Peop. V. Hills, 35 N. Y., 449.
8 Peop. v. Chautauqua, 43 N. Y., iro.
'Peop. v. Allen, 42 N. Y., 378.
*Kerrigan v. Force, 68 N. Y., 381.
' 35
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lic, an Act which manifestly touches but a portion of the.
territory of the State, a part of its people, or a fraction of
the property of its citizens, is not a general law.'
In Williams v. People,' an early case in the same
State, however, it was the opinion of DENIO, J., .though
not actually decided, that'an Act making theft from the
person of property under $25 in value grand larceny, if
committed in the city of New York, was general, as it con-.
cerned every one who might go to that city, and, in faet,
was probably intended rather for the protection of unsophis-
ticated strangers than of the more wide-awake city folk.
Following this dictum, decisions have been rendered
in the lower courts, and cited with apparent approval in
the Court of Appeals, which to some extent confuse gen-
eral laws with public laws, and include as general all laws
(extending to all persons doing or omitting to do an act
within the territorial limits described in the statute." 3
Thus it has been held that a section giving the Supreme
Court exclusive jurisdicti6on in all actions against the cor-
poration of the city of New York was general,' as it made
no distinction .among the persons having a right to sue,
but merely created a class "of civil cases analogous to the
class of criminal cases noticed in Williams v. People.' So,
too, the Act creating the Metropolitan Sanitary District,6
and the section regulating the Court of Special Sessions of
the city of New York7 have been held general, the latter
because it related to part of the judicial system of the
State and thereby affected the people at large, although it
was contained in an Act which was admittedto be local.
'Peop. v. Chautauqua, 43 N. Y., io.
2 24 N. Y., 4o5. The point was raised, but not passed upon in Peop.
v. Mann, i6 id., 58.
3 Burnham v. Acton, 7 Rob. (N. Y.), 395.
4 Bretz v. Mayor, 6 Rob. (N. Y.), 325, 333.
5 24 N. Y., 405, cited subra.
6 Burnham v. Acton, sufira.
7 Peop. v. Davis, 61 Barb. (N. Y.), 456, a case decided by BARNARD
and CARDozo, JJ., and therefore, perhaps, questionable authority.
For a similar decision see Cox v. State, 8 Tex. App., 254, 286, cited infra.
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For the same reason it has been held that the power of the
boards of county supervisors to fix the salaries of county
judges is not a power of local legislation.' It is hard to
reconcile these cases to the doctrine laid down by the
Court of Appeals, as above stated, and as almost every
local law affects people residing outside the locality, the
distinction between general and local laws would seem,
under the doctrine of these cases, to be very indefinite.
In 1874 a constitutional amendment was adopted
prohibiting private and local legislation as to- many mat-
.ters, but the distinction between such legislation and that
which is general still remains rather indefinite. In Matter
of New York Elevated Railway Co.,2 it is judicially stated
that laws whose operation is confined to the existing mem-
bers of the various classes of persons and corporations are
general, and in People .v. Newburg Plank Road Co.3 it was
held tlat the exception of a few counties from the opera-
tion of an Act did not make it local, on the ground that a
local Act was one which 6perated only within a limited
territory or specified locality, and that a territory compris-
ing, nearly the whole State- was not a' limited.'tenltory.
The position of the 'Court of Appeals is, jerhaps, best
,eipressed in EAP.L, J.'s statement that "it is not alwayg
easy to determine what is a local Act . ... No definite
rule can be laid down, but each case must be determined
upon its own circumstances." In other words, it would
seem that in New York any law is general in which the
local or special features do not absolutely predominate, and
this being so it .is nq wonder that 'th'e Co.i~rof 'Appeals
admits that " there may be ways for our legislature to cir-
cumvent a constitutional provision, without violating it." 4
In a recent case an Act was held general" which
prohibited the deposit of carrion, offal, or dead animals in
the North and East Rivers, or in NewYork or Raritan Bays
I Healey v. Dudley, 5 Lans. (N. Y.), 15, 125.
2 70 N. Y., 327, 350.
3 86 N. Y., 1, 7. See Lankford v. Co. Commrs., 73 Md. o5.
4 Matter of N. Y. Elev. Ry. Co., 7o N. V., 327.
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within the jurisdiction of the State of New York. The
purpose of the Act, said the Court, " was essentially pub-
lic, and the fact that it wears some local features was insuffi-
cient to place it among the local Acts. . . . It oper-
ates upon a subject in which the whole people were inter-
ested, prescribes a rule of conduct for all persons, and
renders all persons liable to its penalties wherever they
reside."'
This decision is more readily understood than those:
cited just before. The object of the Act under review was
to prevent the pollution of certain waters which were pecu
liarly exposed to pollution, and where this nuisance was
far more serious than in any other part of the State. For
the purpose of this Act these waters constituted a'class,
and the fact that for convenience they were all mentioned
by name, instead of collectively, cannot affect the matter,
the geographical condition of the State being such that it
may be pronounced impossible that any other of the tidal
waters of the State could ever come into this class. This
reasoning does not apply to the dictum in Williams v. Peo-
ple,- above cited, for even if there be anything in. the offence
of theft from the person to require its more rigid repression
in large cities than elsewhere, there can be no difference in
the respect between New York, and Brdoklyn, Bulffalo,
Albany, or any other large city.
It must be admitted that the local Acts under review
in the cases above referred to were general from one point
of view; they operated upon the public in general, and
not upon particular individuals. In other words, they were
not special. But their sphere of operation was confined to
particular localities, and never could be extended to any
others; and, being local, they could not (with the probable
exception of the Act in regard to pollution of waters)$ be
general in any true sense of the term.
If the definitions previously given are correct, it is
Ferguson v. Ross, 66 S. C. N. Y., 207.
2 24 N.Y., 405.
3 erguson v. Ross, 66 S. C. N. Y., 207.
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clear that, the character of an Act, as general or otherwise,
depends on its substance, not on its form. Thus, no inten-
tion of the legislature, even if directly expressed, that an
Act be regarded as general, will make it such if, it be hot
so in substance.1 On the other hand, an Act which is spe-
cial or local in terms is really general if it apply to an entire
and distinct class. Thus an Act applying to all cities and
towns incorporated under a general law then in force
excludes by its terms all other cities and towns; but if there
are no others, .it is general.2  The Texas constitution (Art.
xvI, § 23), to take another instance,, provides that "the
legislature may pass laws for the regulation of live stock,.
and the protection of stock raisers, in the stock-rais.n-
portion of the State, and exempt from the operation of such.
laws other portions, sections, or counties; and it has been
held that a tock law, exempting by name fromi, its oper-
ations'the counties which were known to be outside the
stock-raising portion of the State, was not only .constitu-
tional, but was really a general law ..
I Another illustration of this-is seenin a Pennsylvania
law, the coiistitutionality of which has appaetly. never
been questioned. The constitution of Penfisylvania. orbid
local or special laws regulating the practice or. jurisdictiofi
of courts, and also reqtiires the legislature' to designate. by
general law the courts and judges by whom .the several.
classes of election contests shall be tried.' The legislature.
has accordingly Provided that contested electionfs for' alf"
State offices except those of governov'and leutenant-goV,,
ernor shall be tried by, the Court. of Common Pleas of Danu"
phin County, the county containig the State capital, to,
which court the two president judges residing, nearest -to.
the court house shall be added.6 Under ordinaryeircumn-
'San Francisco ii. Spring Valley Water Works, 48 Cal., 493; People
v. Cent. Pac. R . RLCo., 83 id., 393.
2 Exfarfe Wells, 21, Fla., 280, 30o.
3 Lastro v. State, 3_Tex. App., 363.
' Const.. of 1874, Art IV., 7.
-Ibid., Art. VI ,-47.
*.Act of ig May, 1874,§.3 ; Purd. Dig;, 68.
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stances all the Courts of Common Pleas- in the State con-
stitiz:e a class, and an Act .applying to only one or to any
number less than the whole, would be special, and so of
their president judges. But for the purpose of trying elec-
tion coritests for State offices the Court which sits at the
capital offers peculiar advantages, and if it is necessary to
enlarge that court for the purpose the nearest president
judges are those who can mpst readily attend. In this
instance that one Court of Common Pleas is as distinctly a
class by itself as is the Supreme Court of the State, and
the contested election law is as thoroughly general in this
as in any other of its features.
On the same principle a law which, though local or
special in form, operates to extend a general system to cases
previously excepted from it, being in the nature of a repeal
of prior local or special laws, is not within the prohibitiofis
of local and special legislation,1 whether the effect .of such
a law be. direct, or whether'it be contingent on the action of
the parties or communities particularly concerned.
These cases illustrate what will be more fully shown
in treating of classification, viz., that the character of an
Act must often -depend on the nature of the subject regu-
lated by it. Thus while the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania was correct in saying of a mechanics' lien law, "If
it apply to the whole State it is general; if to a part only,
it is local: as a general principle it is as effectually local
when it applies to sixty-five counties out of the sixty-seven
as if it applied to one county only: the exclusion of a single
county from the operation of the Act makes it local,"'
yet there are many cases where such a rule would be inap-
plicable. The reason for allowing a mechanics' lien exists
equally in all parts of the same State, nor is there any
ground for allowing or requiring a different mode of obtain-
ing it in different localities; but where the matter to which
the law relates is essentially different in different places,
the exclusion of those localities where the law would be
inapplicable would not make it any the less general.
lRuan St., 132 Pa., 257.
2 Davis v. Clark, io6 Pa., 377, 3 4.
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There are of necessity two exceptions to the rule that
a general law, a law for a whole class, must of its very
nature apply uniformly to all members of the. class to
which it relates. An exception restults from the fact that
a general law does not repeal by implication a prior special
law on the same subject, even though the provisions of the
two may differ,' and this doctrine is not affected by the pro-
hibition of special legislation. on various matters by the
constitution of a State, for it has been repeatedly field that
the restrictions upon local and special legislation are not
retroactive,2 and as a State constitution does not of itself
nullify existing local and special legislation, neither does it
make it the legislature's duty to do so.3  Hence, a general
law may have the uniformity of its operation impaired by
a special law remaining unrepealed, and such restriction of
the operation of the general law, being the result of circum-.
stances which the legislature is not called upon to alter,
does not affect the character of the law as general.' The
legislature may even directly recognize the existence ,of
special laws, and expressly provide that, where they are iur
force, the general law shall not take effect.5
The other exception'is seen where the operation of a
general law is limited by the supreme law of the land.
Thus an Act declaring non-resident aliens incapable 'of
I Gregory's Case, 6 Rep., g6b; People v. Quigg, 59 N. Y., 83; Brown
v. Co. Commrs., 2I Pa., 37; Malloy v. Reinhard,*ix5 id., w5. ,
2Ex fiarte Burke, 59 Cal., 6; Neyada Sch. Dist. v. Shoecraff, 88.
id., 372; Brown v. Denver, 7 Col., 305; Peop. v. Jobs, id., 475; David-
son v. Koehler, 76 Ind., 398; Citizens' Bank v. Wright, 6 0. St., 318;
State v. Roosa, iI id., 16; Evans v. Philippi, 117 Pa., 226; and see
Lehigh Iron Co. v. Lower Macungie, 8r id., 482; Indiana Co. v. Agricul-
tural Soc., 85 id., 357; Coatesville Gas Co. v. Chester Co., 97 id., 476.
- 3 Evans v. Philippi, 117 Pa., 226, 227.
4 Peop. v. Wright, 70 IM., 388; Evans v. Philippi, IX7 Pa., 226. A
law for "each and every village and incorporated town" must, however,
be uqderstood as repealing local laws inconsistent therewith : McCormick
v. People, 139 1ll. 499.
5 Comth. v. Sellers, 13o Pa., 32; In re Road in Cheltenham, i4 o id.,
136. A fortiori, a law framed in general terms, which excepts from its
operation matters regulated by other general laws, is not the less valid
on that account: State v. Collector (N. J. L., 1892), 23 Atl. Rep., 666.
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holding real estate by descent, devise, purchase or other-
wise is general, although it cannot affect those non-resident
aliens who, under treaties between the United States and
the nations to which they belong, are entitled to hold real-
estate in'this country.'
The fact that an Act is in the main general does not
make every part of it so,. If any provision contained in it
be special, such provision is none the less so because con-
tained in an otherwise general Act.'
'The duration of an Act has nothing to do with its char-
acter as general or special. If a temporary statute be general'
in its application during the time it continues in force, it is
none the less a general law because its duration is limited.'
If the conditions upon which a law is to operate do
not exist anywhere at the time of its passage, then until
these conditions come into existence the law must remain
inoperative, and cannot be regarded as either general or
special. If the conditions subsequently exist and prove to
be special, then the law mtst be regarded as special.. This
rather odd state of affairs is. found in a recent New Jersey
case. A statute *as passed providing for the number and
boundaries of ,'wards in cities then or thereafter having
more than two assembly districts exclusively within their
limits. There was no such city, but at a subsequent session
the legislature so districted- the State as to bring Newark
only within the operation of the first Act, which, it was
held, by this means became special, and the concurrent
operation of two Acts to .produce a special result was held
to violate the prohibition of special legislati6n as to the
internal affairs of cities as completely as if it had been
done by a single Act.'
It has already been stated that a general law operates
'Wanderle v. Wunderle (Ill., '1893). 33 N. S. Rep., 195. An excep-
t ion allowing aliens to hold real estate for a limited time under certain
circumstances is also not special legislation, as it applies to al who may
happen to be placed in those circumstances.-Ibid.
Earle v. San Francisco Bd. of Eduen., 55 Cal., 489; Miller v. Kister,
68 id., 142; Peop. v. Cent..Pac. R. R. Co., 83 id., 393.
8 Peop. v. Wright, 70 Ill., 388.
Dempsey v. Newark, 53 N. J. L., 4.
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uniformly on all members of the class to which it applies,
and hence it would seem that the requirement in certain
constitutions that "all laws of a general nature shall have
a uniform operation throughout the State," and that. in
others that laws in regard to certain matters, "shall be
general and of uniform operation throughout the State,"
are really superfluous. That uniformity of operation which
characterizes a general law, does not, however, involve its
going into effect everwhere at identically the same time.
Nearly all general laws do or may apply to and affect per-
sons or property not in esse at the date of their passage, but
this does not affect their uniformity. If a law operates
equally upon all the subjects embraced within it when they
come within the scope of its authority, this is uniformity.
Thus an Act vesting the judicial power in a certain class
of cities, in a police court to be held by the city justices,
was properly sustained as general, although it ,necessarily
took effect in each city respectively at the expiration of the
terms of the police justices then in office, terms which
expired at different dates.'
Although a law can never, from a legal point of view,
be both general and special at the'same time, yet a general
law may be practically special from the fact that but one
or a very few persons, places, or things exist to which it
can apply. That is often the case with laws in regard to
municipal corporations, and the most usual objection to
legislative classification is that a law for a single city is:
*special, just as much when enacted for a class containing
that city only as if the city were named in the Act. This
objection would be valid if the class could never include
any other members, but neither in regard to cities nor to
other subjects is a law special if its operation is not neces-
sarily limited to particular persons, places, and things for
all future time. The sphere of operation of any general
law is always conceivably capable of being widened or nar-
rowed at any time, as the class to which it applies gains or
loses members. If but one railroad company existed in a
I Peop. v. Henshaw, 76 Cal., 436.
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State, a general railroad law would not on that account be
special, either if there never had been any other such com-
pany in that State, or if this one company had absorbed
several others, which had therefore ceased to have any
independent existence. The fact that any such law is
practigally special may be unfortunate; it may lead to the
same abuses which have marked special legislation, but such
results cannot be avoided by any mere requirement that the
legislature shall enact general laws only.
The schedule," or set of regulations contained in a
constitution as to the time at which and the manner in
which the various changes introduced thereby shall go -into
operation, includes in many cases a general provision that
"the legislature shall pass all such laws as may be neces-
sary to carry this constitution into full effect," while some
constitutions contain similar provisions in regard to par-
ticular articles or sections. Such laws have beeii held in
Missouari to be directly authbrized by the constitution, to
be practically a creation of the people whose will is
expressed in the constitution, and therefore to stand on a
higher plane than any other statutes, and to coxfstitute an
exception to th restrictions upon local and special legisla-
tion. The constitution having established the St..Louis
Court of Appeals, and a reporter being necessary to that
court, an Act creating the office of such reporter simply
completed the judicial machinery which the constitution
had planned, and it derived its sanction from that instru-
ment. Though a special law in that it affected one court
only, it was equivalent to a general law in that it was sub-
ject to none of the restrictions upon special laws.'
The decision did not, it is true, touch the case of any
prohibition of such legislation, but only the requirement of
prior publication in the locality to be affected, such publi-
cation being intended to enable the people to oppose the
passage of any special or local law which they did not
approve, a contingency which was out of the question in
the case of a law authorized by the constitution. The doc-
I State v. Shields, 4 Mo. App., 259.
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trine on which the decision is based seems sound, and must
logicallyv extend and constitute an exception to all prohibi-
tions of local and special legislation whatever.
At the same time this doctrine must be kept strictly
within its proper limits. In the first place, no special legis-
lation should be permitted except where the constitution,
allows it either expressly or by necessary implication, for it
is absurd to speak of carrying the constitution into effect
by any law which would "destroy the uniform operation of
laws which are required by the constitution itself to have
a uniform operation." Thus the constitution of California,
making special provisions for the assessment of the property
of railroad companies whose roads extend through more than
one county, and for the apportionment of such assessment
among the several counties where the roads are situated, the
legislature could properly pass laws providing the details for;
such assessment and apportionment, although special legisla-
tion in regard to the assessment of taxes, as well as in regard
to their collection, is forbidden. But these provisions as to a
special mode of assessing such property for taxation do n6t
imply that the taxes so assessed should be collected by any
other means than that provided by the general law apply-
ing to the collection of .taxes on all kinds of property, and
hence an Act providing a special system for the levy :and
collection of taxes upon this particular kind of property is
unconstitutional.'
Secondly, where the end to be sought can be accom-
plished by a general law, this should be, done, for the
explicit provisions as to many subjects in the more recent
constitutions are intended to take the place of special legis-
lation, not to provide-opportunities for it.
Lastly, the expression "to carry the constitution into
full effect" should not be extended beyond its proper mean-
ing, and the doctrine should be applied only to Iiose Vases
where the machinery provided by the constitution needs,
so to speak, something more to enable it to work, and not
to those which simply give it something to work upon.
'People v. Cent. Pac. R. R. Co., 43 Cal., 398.
